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EARLY APPRAISALS
'PLACE IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THOUGHT*
By Paul T. Homan
There is a certain consensus of opinion among economists in the
United States that the most capable of their number among the
younger men is Professor Wesley C. Mitchell. Unlike most econo-
mists of earlier generations and the "elders" of the present genera-
tion, his reputation is not based upon any compendious or detailed
treatise in the field of economic theory. His work has, in fact, been
mainly concerned with a field so far from thç subtleties of theory as
the application of statistical technique to the investigation of eco-
nomic phenomena. His peculiar competence in this field is the
initial basis upon which the consideration in which he is held rests.
He has, however, joined to work of this character a sustained in-
terest in the theoretical problems of economics. From time to time,
in speeches. and articles, he has developed his views on economic
theory, and in his university classroom has perhaps been most effec-
tive and popular when dealing with the problems of theory. Con-
cerning the importance or significance of his theoretical views there
would be found no such consensus as concerning his competence
as an investigator. It is probable, however3 that in his views can
be found a better expression than elsewhere of a newer trend of
economic thought which, in the United States, is producing a
marked hiatus between the ideology of the older and younger
generations of economists. He may, consequently, be taken, not
as the spokesman of a generation of economic thinking, but as an
illuminating example of certain currents of thought which, dur-
ing the present century, have been recasting the intellectual con-
cepts underlying economic theory.
*Originallypublished as a chapter in Homan's Contemporary Economic
Thought (Harper, 1928). Here reprinted, with minor changes, by permission
of author and publisher.
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It is only by a sort of license that one speaks of Professor Mitchell
as belonging to the younger generation. Having safely turned the
mid-century mark and having served his term as president of the
American Economic Association, he might well expect to be in-
cluded among those who are mature and wise. But one thinks of
him against the background of that distinguished and
group of American economists who have for a generation adorned
the scene of economic thought. And one also thinks of him in
terms of his spiritual consanguinity. In these terms he is perhaps
closer to the youngest instructor than to the most' venerable of his
associates upon the facultyeconomics at Columbia University.
Born in a small Illinois town, Mitchell passed through the pub-
lic schools of Decatur to the University of Chicago. There is no
record that he grew up with any other complement of ideas than
might be common to any well-brought-up Middle Western boy.
He doubtless approached the university armed with little more
than small-town common-sense notions, a good mind, and an
eager intelligence. He entered the university in 1892 and was there
as a student continuously until 1899, with the exception of a single
year when he pursued his postgraduate studies at the Universities
of Halle and Vienna.
The decade of the nineties was marked by great interest in the
theoretical aspects of economic study. The theoretical work cen-
tered largely on the refinement and elaboration of the marginal-
utility theory of value, and upon the discoTvery of a theory of dis-
tribution congruent therewith. It was during this decade that
John Bates Clark was rising to the position of the foremost Ameri-
can economic theorist. The type of theory wrought out during the
period, compounded out of the writings of Alfred Marshall, J. B.
Clark, and the Austrians, has continued down to the present day
to be the kind mainly taught in the schools.
•Mitchell's theoretical pOsition has been of quite a different sort,
and it should prove enlightening to examine the curious, negative
relationship of the development of his views to the drift of theory
at that time. In spite of undergoing his apprenticeship during the
nineties, circumstances combined to keep him from being swept
into the main current. At the University of Chicago the outstand-
ing figure in economics was Professor J. Laurence Laughlin, who,'
/ /
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more persistently than any other American economist, clung to
the classical tradition. Brought up on Mill, he remained true to
Mill's type of analysis and was never seduced by the subtle blan-
dishments of subjective economic theory. He was, indeed, its vio-
lent opponent and one of its keenest critics. So far as he made con-
cessions tolater.thought, his sympathy lay much more with Mar-
shall than with the Austrians. It was under Laughlin's tutelage
that Mitchell was inducted into economic studies, and learned to
look askance at prevalent doctrines.
Laughlin's primary interest was in currency questions and
monetary pi-oblems, and it was under his influence that Mitchell
undertook his first important task, a study of the greenbacks. This
beginning was crucial and decisive, for out of the problems and
technique of his doctoral thesis came the nature, scope, and direc-
tion of Mitchell's later work. It is not often that the dissertations
of graduate students become classics, but such has been the fortune.
of the History of the Greenbacks which remains the standard work
on one of the most important episodes in American monetary
history.
The part played by, Laughlin in Mitchell's development was to
catch him young, assist in saving him from the methods of margi-
nal-utility analysis, implant in him high standards of scientific
workmanship, and set him upon the statistical investigation of
monetary problems. But he did not succeed .in implanting an ad-
herence to the doctrines of classical economics in his mind. The
nature of the greenback investigation doubtless had something to
do with this, as will be seen. But the primary reason may probably
be traced to the presence of two men upon the staff of the Univer-
sity of Chicago, Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey.
Dewey was disseminating the novel doctrines of pragmatism
from his chair in the department of philosophy, and Mitchell was
one of his students. Dewey, of course, was doing nothing if not
casting doubt upon systems of philosophy whose chief virtue was
their internal logical consistency. He was exposing to view the
social origins of the preconceptions upon which systems were built.
He was attempting to rebuild philosophy upon a foundation of
modern psychology and epistemology. And he was advancing a
view of life and knowledge as an adventurous process in which158 PAUL T. HOMAN
mankind is attempting with developing intelligence to direct and
control its increasingly complex environment.
Veblen was in a way the complement of Dewey, or his partner
in crime. Dewey, of course, was a social reformer, and Veblen was
a But both alike were under the influence of an evolution-
ary view of social development. The one in philosophy, the other
in economics, was attempting to reshape the thinking in his own
field into conformity with the findings of modern science. In their
views upon the development of human thought and institutions
their thought is to a considerable degree parallel and contiguous,
and one infers that Veblen was himself indebted to Dewey. At the
time when Mitchell was a graduate student Veblen was in the
process of constructing the devastating attack which he made upon
formal systems of economic theory. He had been a student of
Veblen's since his undergraduate days and was much impressed
by the latter's philosophical attack and by his notion of the genetic
approach to economic theory. It was, indeed, as an offset to. the
philosophical influence of Veblen and Dewey that Laughlin had
suggested to Mitchell the .very concrete and realistic subject of
greenbacks for his doctor's thesis. The association was not termi-
nated at the end of Mitchell's perio.d of graduate study, for, after a
year as a statistician at the United States Census Office in 1900, he
returned to Chicago and was associated with Veblen upon the fac-
ulty of political economy at the university for a number of years.
It is plain that Dewey and Veblen, particularly the latter, had
a decisive influence upon Mitchell's attitude toward systematic
economic theory. From Veblen, too, he drew a framework of ideas
into which' to fit his thinking upon the problems which engaged
his interest. In a limited sense, he may be regarded as a disciple of
Veblen, and the extent of his debt our later exposition should
make clear.
It would, however,a serious misconception to regard Mitchell,
as merely someone to be explained in terms of Laughlin, Dewey,
and Veblen. One, must limit their influence to something of a
'germinal sort, providing him in his more impressionable days with,
respectively, a direction for his work, a social and philosophical
outlook, and a framework of economic concepts of an unorthodox
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whowere struggling in an open-minded way with the problems of
economic theory, particularly H; J. Davenport and R. F. Hoxie.
He was associated, too, with a group of distinguished workers in
the other social sciences, most of whom were working, in a pioneer-
ing way to reshape their thinking in relation to the increasingly
complex problems of modern society, with relatively little reverent
adherences to traditional of thought. In just what way intel-.
lectual influences of this sort combined to shape Mitchell's think-
ing represents an aspect of the undisçoverable personal equation.,
It seems merely worth while to mention them in passing, in order
to indicate the circumstances under which he worked, which were
peculiarly favorable to the development of an independent and
emancipated viewpoint.
The History of the Greenbacks, Mitchell's first work, was con-
cerned only in a secondary way with theoretical questions. It was
primarily a project in economic history. Yet it deserves some slight
attention, as bearing upon the develàpment of Mitchell's later
views. The book covers only the period of the Civil War. The first
part is taken up with a history of the legal-tender acts, and deals
with the.financialexigencies which led to them, and with the
political situation out of which they arose. The second part, deal-
ing with the economic consequences of the legal-tender acts, is
an attempt to determine the influence of a fluctuating standard of
value upon the economic welfare of various groups of .the popula-
tion, and upon the production and consumption of wealth. Eco-
nomic theory of the normalizing sort has, of course, regarded
money as a mere convenience and, for purposes of building up
theories of value and distribution, assumed a stable monetary unit.
Economists, reflecting upon the vagaries of monetary values, had
from time to time arrived at various, speculative conclusions con-
cerning the effects of the "friction" involved in an unstable unit
of money. Mitchell's was, however, perhaps the. first extensive
objective investigation into the subject.
His investigation marked by two interesting variations from
the speculative treatment of monetary theory. In the first•place, he
dealt with what, from the point of view of orthodox tradition, was
an element of "friction" in the normal operation of economic
forces. From the point of view of 'his own intellectual development,160 PAUL T. HOMAN
the important fact is that he was from the start interested in the
"disturbing," and not in the "normal" aspects of economic ad-
justment. His mind was being compelled to run back from the
objective facts of an unstable monetary unit, a fluctuating price
level, and a shifting allocation of distributive shares to the less
patent facts which lay behind them—politics, the credit of the
government, popular sentiment and belief, and the unequal inci-
dence of price changes upon the real income of various classes.. He
was exploring economic processes, in which a complex system oi
money payments stood between the production and enjoyment of
goods. Examining the influence of unstable money upon economic
welfare, his attention ran not to any beautiful scheme of normal
adjustment, but off into the complicated scene of human institu-
tions and states of mind.
The other interesting characteristic of his study was that it was
based upon the use of a. statistical technique. The data, with which
he worked were sets of statistical tables, showing the course of bul-
lion prices, commodity prices, wages, interest rates, rent, and profits
under the'greenback standard. His primary conclusions then dealt'
with matters of sequence, relative change, and the like, and consti-
tuted an inductive display of the effect of the greenbacks upon the
purchasing power of the recipients of various classes of income.
In effect, his task was the collection and interpretation of relevant
statistics. In attempting, however, to explain the meaning of his
statistics and to establish causal relationships, he was compelled to
go outside his quantitative data. His recourse here was to the eco-
nomic arrangements through which incomes reach their recipients,
and to the course of external events, which, by affecting the credit
of the government and public confidence in the greenbacks, led to
price fluctuations and the further disturbance of the relationship
between income groups.
It is not necessary here to, go.into the nature of his more general
conclusions, except briefly. He found that profits increased at the
expense of wages, interest, and rent. He concluded that prices
fluctuated much more in relation to the state of public confidence
in the outcome of the war than in relation to the quantity of the
currency. He did not find that high profits stimulated an increase <'
ofphysical production, nor that wartime "prosperity" was morePLACE IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 161
than an illusion to the great mass of the population. These and
other findings he attempted to give no general theoretical impor-
tance, presenting them as mere statements of fact for the brief
period covered. The bearing of this investigation upon the develop-
ment of his theoretical views was, however, of undoubted impor-
tance. For he was dealing with precisely those topics, value and
distribution, upon which economic theory had most fully and con-
fidently spoken. Treating them quantitatively in the light of a uni-
versally disturbing currency situation, he found that his conclu-
sions fitted into no scheme of the normal equilibrium of economic
forces. Such value as they had was merely by way of elucidating
the course of economic welfare within a given period and under
given circumstances.
It may be said in passing that the effects of the greenbacks con-
tinued to interest Mitchell, and he published in 1908 a companion
volume to the History, entitled Gold, Prices, and Wages under the
Green back Standard, carrying the record down tO the resumption
of specie payments in 1879. This volume consisted almost entirely
of statistical tables, with only text enough to explain the sources
and methods, and to indicate the general character of the results.
The intention was that the volume should furnish the statistical
basis for a thoroughgoing investigation of the economic conse-
quences of the greenbacks during the whole period of their incon-
That' task. was never completed, due doubtless to the
shifting of Mitchell's interest to a wider field of investigation. As
anyone who has examined them will understand, the volumes on
the greenbacks represent an amount and quality, of work almost
incredible for a man to have achieved by his thirty-fifth year in the
of other duties. Thus, long before anyone knew or listened
to his views on economic theory, indeed before he seems to have
formulated them at all clearly, Mitchell had established a reputa-
tion as perhaps the most competent handler of economic statistics
in the country.
Mitchell appears to have been jarred out of whatever predilec-
tions he may have held for classical or neoclassical economic theory
•by Veblen's essays near the turn of the century. He was impressed
• by. the view that economics must approach its problems from the
evolutionary point of view, and by the idea thatthe key to an ade-162 PAUL T. HOMAN
'quate understanding of the working of the economic system must
rest upon an understanding of the human habits of thought and
institutions which direct economic activity. He was particularly
by the distinction which Veblen made between business,
or pecuniary, and industrial, or technological, aspects of economic
activity. This distinction, developed brilliantly in the Theory of
•Business Enterprise ('which Mitchell considersgreat book"),
became an essential instrument in his scheme of thought.
The distinction was one peculiarly designed to fit into Mitchell's
•handling of his own problems. As we have seen, he was engaged
in an investigation of economic welfare from the point of view of
•the effects, of an inconvertible currency. system. He discovered,
of course, that, while welfare depends upon an abundance and
equitable distribution of concrete goods, the most remarkable
variations in the well-being of classes of the population arose merely
from the financial disturbances related to a fluctuating monetary
unit. He found, too, that the fluctuations in physical production
were in no way parallel or comparable to the extraordinary varia-
•tions in money prices and pecuniary rewards.
In other ways his investigations were designed to throw his
analysis of economic activity into other terms than those of an
equilibrium of economic.forces. For example, the monetary system
which could play such extraordinary tricks upon people's income
and their physical well-being was purely a human institution, de-
vised and instituted by a legislature in extreme ignorance of its
ultimate consequences. It appeared that the application of human
intelligence to the solution of economic problems and to the plan-
fling of economic life was a more fertile and fruitful field of study
than the subtle elaboration of what logical results would flow from
the play of the self-regarding impulses under a competitive organ-
ization of economic life. Briefly, economic theory seemed to make
too simple and abstract a picture of the institutions through which
economic activity found expression. It was through the channel
of monetary history that Mitchell became acutely aware of the
decisive importance of humanly devised and humanly changeable
And it was these that increasingly caught his interest.
Again, 'his studies centered attention upon the controlling impor-
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dustrial processes. It became apparent how loosely profits were
related to the supplying of useful goods, how largely they depended
upon mere differential trading advantages, and how directly they
were affected by exigencies and circumstances of every conceiv-.
able sort. There thus sprang up in his mind a vivid interest in the
relationship between the businessman's pursuit of profits and the
community's concern for the well-being of all its members.. Con-
crete data seemed not to fit in, for example, with J. B. Clark's
view of the automatic solution of this problem.
Moreover, the period of time with which Mitchell was con-
cerned in his earlier studies was one of most rapid and spectacular
change in American economic life. In business methods, technical
methods, population, agriculture, labor relationships, indeed over
the whole field of ecOnomic organization, there was a rapidity of
development which could hardly impress an objective observer as
less than a revolution. It was, in fact, the industrial revolution get-
ting thoroughly under way upon the American scene. Other ob-
servers, of course, continued to speculate in static terms, while
recognizing the immense significance of this "dynamic" move-
ment. It was these phenomena that J. B. Clark had in mind as the
fruitful field of the economist's labor. But somehow the older meth-
ods of theoretical analysis seemed never quite to come to grips
with the facts. No one could classify or codify this sweep of events
into economic laws. A puzzling and prominent aspect of the period
was. that the growth was not regular, but proceeded by fits and
starts. Backward and forward swung the pendulum of high profits
and low profits, intensity and dullness of industrial activity, plenty
and want for laborers.
All these things and, a variety of allied questions came of neces-
sity under Mitchell's attention in the course of collecting and inter-
preting his greenback data. The whole nature, scope, and method
of his earlier work came, therefore, to serve as a sort of apprentice-
ship for his most important contribution to the economic thought
of our times, his study of business cycles.'
book, Business Cycles, was published in 1913. It was written in the
years 1909-12, duringthe period of his residence at the University of California,
where he had gone from Chicago, and in the following year when he was
unattached to any institution.164 PAUL T. HOMAN
H
Crises and panics had long attracted the attention of economists,
but during the nineteenth century they were generally entered in
theoretical treatises as an afterthought to monetary or banking
theory. By the early years of the twentieth century, analysis had,
to a limited extent, moved from the earlier recognition of the
periodicity of crises to a recognition of the somewhat regularly re-
curring round of alternating periods of prosperity and depression,
or of greater and lesser intensity of business activity. The mounting
interest in the subject is attested by the considerable number of.
theories propounded in explanation of cycles during the first
decade of the century. These theories, by well-known and compe-
tent economists,' were for the most part highly plausible, but suf-
fered from the one major defect that they all offered different
explanations. The subject was therefore wrapped in not a little
mystery which the diversity of explanations only deepened. At the
same time, it was of the most immediate and practical impor-
tance, in that the instability of business activity served to accentu-
ate all the imperfections which marred the efficiency of the eco-
nomic system in serving the needs of the community. It constituted
therefore. a standing and stimulating challenge to the intellectual
faculties of• scientific investigators.
It is nOt unlikely that Mitchell's imagination was most directly
touched by Veblen's treatment of the subject in the Theory of
Business Enterprise, and grew' as he became acquainted with the
theories of Hobson, Beveridge, Aftalion, Sombart, and others as
they appeared. One defect he found in them all, that they betrayed
a 'great paucity of facts. From a certain antecedent standpoint of
general theory and from certain limited if relevant facts, each suc-
ceeded in raising a logical structure of explanation, the plausibility
of which was only marred by the fact that no one was any more
plausible than some of the others.. Mitchell's approach was novel
and, in a degree, revolutionary. And since his approach to this
problem is in a considerable degree the key to his whole contribu-
tion to economic theory, we may examine it with some care.
His primary conviction was that little could be done with logic,
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had been tried with no better outcome than the mutual defeat of
competing theories. What was required, he conceived, was "the
collection and analysis of elaborate records of business experience
in quantitative form." Itseemed to him necessary to consider not
some, but all of the facts that might measurably affect the regu-
larity of business activity. The facts; too, must be of a sort not
merely capable of discovery, but of measurement. And the only
facts which seemed to admit of scientific treatment were statistical
facts. "Since in his efforts to make accurate measurements the
economic investigator cannot devise experiments, he must do the
best he can with the cruder gauges afforded by statistics."2
He was, moreover, convinced, that the data should not be gath-
ered with reference to any theory already in mind, but that, on
the contrary, after the collection of all the available relevant facts
had been completed, they should be carefully analyzed and made to
yield such conclusions as they themselves contained. Here then we
find Mitchell engaged upon a study for which his greenback studies
had eminently fitted him, both as regarded the use of statistical
tools and as regarded a certain detached and objective viewpoint.
The scientific task was enormously larger since his problem rami-
fied into the most remote corners of the intricate processes of the
economic system and carried the burden of suggesting
for business instability, as well as of discovering its causes. Concern-
ing the theoretical bearing of his task it is not probable that
Mitchell gave much thought or had any clear conception at the
outset, and the point may be postponed. Probably he saw merely
an interesting and important investigation awaiting someone, and
saw in it possibilities of quantitative statistical analysis of the sort
of which he was master.
However objective one might wish to make such a study, it was
nevertheless essential to have some framework of ideas into which
to fit the data. In short, there must be some test of relevancy. In
setting up this test, Mitchell displays an implicit theoretical posi-
tion. he prefaces his investigation by a brief statement of his
view of the operation of the economic system. And in this state-
ment, negatively, or by neglect, he may be said to discard adher-.
2BusinessCycles, p. 20.166 PAUL T. HOMAN
ence to any orthodox view of economic processes; while, posi-
tively, his descriptive analysis rests upon the distinction, taken
explicitly from Veblen, of the distinction between business and
industry. From an isolated sentence in the History of the Green-
backs3 one supposes that he was then beginning to think in those
terms. The distinction is more clearly stated in Gold, Prices, and
Wages under the Greenback Standard4 in an incidental way.
But in the writing of Business Cycles Mitchell made it the funda-
mental conception upon which his whole examination rested.
His approach to the study of business cycles depended, he con-
ceived, upon an adequate understanding of the role of moncy in
the economic organization. In the second greenback volume he
had written, "Writers upon money usually state that it performs
three functions, serving as a common denominator of value, a
medium of exchange, and a standard of deferred payments. To
enumerate the functions of money in this fashion, however, is very
far from suggesting the importance of the role which money plays
in economic life. To understand this role attention must be fixed
upon the complex mechanism of prices, rather than upon money
itself."5 "Money prices, in brief, are the formal basis on which the
economic relations of individuals in modern society are organized
and the formal mechanism bywhich economic processes are carried
on."° "The system of prices has a quasi-independence of the will
of individuals or even of the whole community. ..Menwho
make use of the system of prices in their economic activity are
constrained to obey its logic and to adapt themselves as best they
may to its technical exigencies."7
This view is enlarged upon and clarified in Business Cycles. On
its economic side, modern life is organized within the confines of
the "money economy," an institution of which the essential fea-
ture is "not the use of money as a medium of exchange, but the
factthateconomic activity takes the form of making and spending
money incomes."8 To the community as a whole, material well-
being is determined by the abundance of useful goods. But to the
8Page395. .'Page280.
Gold, Prices, and Wages under the Greenback Standard, pp. 279-280.
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individual, or family, it depends, not upon efficiency in making
useful goods, but upon the command of an adequate money
income.
Under the money economy, the production of useful goods
waits upon the prospect of profit. "The elaborate co-operative
process by which a natton's myriad workers provide for the meet-
ing of each other's needs is thus brought into precarious depen-
dence upon factors which have but a remote connection with the
material of well-being—factors which determine the
prospects of making The industrial and commercial
processes of producing and distributing goods comprise ahighly
complicated concatenation of processes, linking the whole indus-
trial system. in a mechanical interdependence. The functioning of
these mechanical processes, however, awaits the exercise of the
discretion of businessmen whose interest in the processes is almost
solely confined to the money profit to be obtained from them.
In other words, goods produced are a byproduct of the process of
earning profits.
The business enterprises, whose interests are primarily pecuni-
ary, are themselves bound together in a system of financial inter-
dependence, somewhat analogous to the mechanical interdepen-
dence of industrial processes; and the most marked aspect of this
interdependence is the endless chain of interlocking indebtedness
between business enterprises. It is the logic and exigencies of this
scheme of financial relationships that everywhere dictate the course
of action of enterprises engaged in the pursuit of profits; from
which "it follows that a theory of modern prosperity must deal
primarily with business conditions—with the pecuniary aspect of
economic activity."0 Fluctuations of business activity must there-
fore be regarded as a problem in the fluctuating prospects of
profits. Until that point has been reached, the problem has not
even been stated.
From the businessman's point of view, the fundamental condi-
tion of business prosperity is the price margin between purchase
prices and sale prices, in conjunction with the volume of trans-
actions. The quest of profits thus takes place through the mecha-
9Ibid., p.22. p.25.168 PAULT. HOMAN
nism of the system of prices. Three types of goods—commodities,
services, and rights such as securities and bank credits—are objects
of purchase and sales. Between the prices for the various kinds of
goods there exists a complicated set of relationships which bind
them into a system. "The prices ruling at any given time for the
infinite variety of commodities, services, and rights which are being
bought and sold constitute a system. That is, these prices are so
related to each other as to make a regular and connected whole."1
The retail prices of commodities are related loosely to one another,
and more directly to wholesalers' and manufacturers' prices. The
prices of producers'.goods are related in a variety of ways to those
of consumers' goods. As goods proceed through the series of trans-
actions which carry them to their various ultimate uses, the price
margins at one point and another are marked -bygreat diversity;
but these: diversities are sufficiently regular to furnish to business-
men a tolerable basis for making profits out of supplying the com-
munity with the goods it habitually uses.
Without going into Mitchell's careful analysis of price relation-
ships in any detail, we must grasp his conception that the price
system constitutes a closed system, "an endless chain." "The prices
of producers' goods do not form the ends of the series of price rela-
tionships, but the beginnings of new series of relationships which
run backward with countless ramifications and never reach definite
stopping points."2 "The price system has no definable limits in
time. No analysis can get back to the ultimate term in the endless
series of bargains which helped to make the prices of the present.
•Nor has the system of prices any logical beginning or end."3
It is "a system infinitely flexible in detail yet stable in the essential
balance of its interrelations, a system like a living organism in its
ability to recover from the serious disorders into which it periodi-
cally falls." This system is the "social mechanism for carrying on
the process of providing goods," and its distinctive role is to
"render possible the rational direction of economic activity by
accounting."
The high development of corporate organization and the corn-
plicated division of functiqns within it cause Mitchell to regard
as obsolete and negligible the usual simplified view of the direction
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of economic activity, according to which the "capitalist-employer"
is supposed to supply the capital, assume the risks, superintend the
operation, and take the profits of his business. He is attempting to
set forth a realistic view of the direction of economic activity.
A primary defect of economic organization under the money
economy is the lack of effective co-ordination between the opera-
tions of independent enterprises. "In detail, then, economic activ-
ity is planned and directed with skill; but in the large there is
neither general plan nor central direction."4 Production is "con-
trolled by no large human purpose." It follows the line of prospec-
tive profits, not the line of human good. The money economy in-
sures no humanly desirable distribution of goods. It merely assures
abundance to those sufficiently canny to intercept a generous
money income. Moreover, the smooth functioning of the system is
marred by large elements of uncertainty which increase as progres-
sive technique and widening markets baffle the intelligent planning
of enterprisers. It is, then, in the nature of the money economy, the
structure of the price system, and the defective co-ordination of
the separate business enterprises that one must look, under modern
conditions of complex economic life, for the explanation of the
recurring disorders of the economic system.
It should be understood that the range of ideas which we have.
been discussing does not constitute any of Mitchell's conclusions
from his detailed analysis of business cycles. It is the framework of
preliminary ideas within which he proposes to fit his findings. The
controlling preconception is the subordination of industrial, and
commercial processes to the money-making process. "The ebb and
flow of economic activity is brought into dependence upon the
profits of business enterprises. Upon this basic fact the whole in-
vestigation rests. Profits, in their turn, depend upon the margins
between buying and selling prices, and upon the volume of trans-
actions. First, then, we must seek for data to measure variations
in prices and variations in the volume of trade. ...Theprices of
importance in gauging profits are not merely the prices of com-
modities, but also the prices of labor, of loans, and of business
•enterprises themselves."15 .
Thetest of the relevancy of data therefore becomes their bear-
"Ibid., p.38. Ibid.,p.92.170 PAUL T. HOMAN
ing "upon the crucial problem of business profits, either by deal-
ing with factors which determine profits, like prices and volume
of trade; or by dealing with necessary conditions for the successful
quest of profits, like the currency, banking, and investment; or by
offering direct gauges of business success and failure, like the sta-
tistics of profits themselves and of bankruptcies."1°
It may be contended that this descriptive framework has no
particular bearing upon one or another type of economic theory,
but Mitchell would not concur in that opinion. Marginal-utility
theory is mainly concerned with an analysis of subjective values,
of which prices are the objective monetary expression. Mitchell is
not concerned directly with the subjective side of the valuation
process, but emphasizes the organic èharacter of the price struc-
ture. It may be held that he does not discredit Austrian theory,
and that he is concerned with quite a different problem which
does not cut across the value problem. The same comment could
be made concerning the relation of his descriptive analysis to the
neoclassical value theory, as represented by Marshall's theory of
the normal equilibriumof supply and demand. It is true, of course,
that his problem is a different one from theirs. But the introductory
chapters of Business Cycles cannot be intelligently read without
perceiving that they rest upon a groundwork of ideas incompatible
with any of the variant statements of orthodox economic theory.
The difference centers around Mitchell's conception of the role
of money, and the distinction between pecuniary 'and industrial
factors in economic activity. Most modern types of theory with a
classical genealogy trace the motives of economic activity back to
certain fundamental human traits which may be roughly divided
into two classes—those which incite to activity in order to secure
the satisfactions of consumption, and those which discourage ac-
tivity because of the irksomeness of effort. Upon these underlying
"real forces" is built up the conception of the system of normal
prices representing an objective expression of an underlying human
calculation of alternatives. Money enters into the case merely as a
convenience, to facilitate the smooth working of the economic
system, but not giving it any of its fundamental features.
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Mitchell, on the other hand, sees money, or the pursuit of a
money income, as the primary motive in business activity. This
pursuit may be of a highly rational sort, but it is rational Only in
the sense that the money economy enjoins a certain kind of activity
on pain of the failure to acquire the desired income. The money
economy is itself a dominating feature• of our institutional life
which shapes the nature and direction of economic activity. It
provides the logic of bñsiness, and the fact that business enterprise
is guided by that logic throws no light upon and bears but a loose
relationship to the material well-being of the community. One
may, indeed, follow the logic of pecuniary gain to the patent dam-
• age of the community's well-being.
•It must, then, be plain that Mitchell's scheme of thought is
antipathetic to the methods and conclusions of marginal-utility
•analysis, to all theories of distribution based upon it, and to all
•notions of an equilibrium of "real" economic forces which are
expressed in a system of prices. He regards economic motivation
.as largely the outcome of the institutions by which human nature
is disciplined. His concern is to discover the nature of these insti-
tutions, and then by the study of objective data to explain the con-
sequences of their operation.
As we are interested here only in the more general aspects of
Mitchell's theoretical position, it will be unnecessary to follow the
detailed argument of his study of business cycles. It may be said
briefly that it follows the plan which he had so thoroughly learned
to use in his previous greenback studies, of gathering, ordering,
and interpreting statistical data. His statistics cover the period
from 1890 to 1911, and are drawn from theUnited States, Great
Britain, France and Germany. He follows the course of price fluc-
tuations of consumers' goods at retail and wholesale, o,f producers'
goods, of manufactured goods and raw materials, of organic and
inorganic goods. He follows the course of wages, of interest, and
of security prices in detail and under various methods of classifica-
•tion. He examines the physical volume of trade; the volume of
currency; the condition of banks; the course of saving, investment,
new enterprises, and speculation; and the records of profits and
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drawn a comprehensive statement of the sequence of events during
the course of a cycle, accompanied by a series of suggestions of
ways and means for stabilizing business.
Quite apart from theoretical considerations, the factual data in
Business Cycles added enormously to the existing knowledge con-
cerning business fluctuations. And the study, by demonstrating the
advantages of realistic treatment, was the decisive factor in turning
the investigation of cycles from speculative to quantitative analysis.
By tracing the ramifying effects of cyclical fluctuations into end-
less relationships to other aspects of the economic system, Mitchell
gaye the lead for many new investigations; so much so, in fact,
that within a decade after the appearance of the book the study
of almost all current economic problems had been in some con-
siderable degree revolutionized.
Out, of his collected data Mitchell attempted to distill a theory
Of cyclical fluctuations. His theory was, however, of a sort quite
distinct from preceding ones. For, while they had, on the basis. of
certain limited data, proceeded by logical processes to trace fluc-
tuations to one or two outstanding "causes," Mitchell's theory
consisted of a statement of certain sequences or relationships which
his statistics showed to recur more or less regularly during the
progressive movement of business .activityfrom depression to
"prosperity" and from "prosperity" to depression. In studying one
cyclical period after another, he had, of course, to give .due atten-
tion to the fact that each cycle was affected, in the process- of
"cumulativechange," by unique, nonrecurring forces such as war
demands. In interpreting his statistics he was convinced, however,
that these unique forces, though they made each cycle differ char-
-acteristicallyfrom every other, could be sufficiently abstracted to
permit a statement of the regularly recurring sequences and rela-
tionships between prices, incomes, physical production, profits,
and' the other phenomena included in his investigation.
In advancing a theory cOnsisting of a statement of these se-
quences and relationships, Mitchell appealed to no final or ulti-
mate "causes" of cycles. It appeared to him that the round from
prosperity to crisis to depression to recovery, the continual alterna-
tion of expansion and contraction of business activity, is cumula-
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ates through the money economy under modern industrial
conditions.,
In a certain definite sense, then, one may say that Mitchell's
theory is of a "static" sort. That is to say, he uses the ideas of "proc-
ess" and "cumulative causation," not to describe the evolution of
the institutions through which economic activity takes place, as
Vebleñ had done, but to describe the fluctuations which business
undergoes within the confines of a given institutional situation. So
far as his investigation is concerned, institutions are a relatively
constant, not a highly variable, factor.
Just what the institutional situation is, in terms of which he
works, he is at no pains to make clear. He does not, for example,
attempt to say how far modern business is competitive, and how
far monopolistic, nor whether these alternative modes of business
organization affect his results. One will, in fact, search in vain in
Mitchell's work for an explanation of what he means by an "eco-
nomic institution," though he stresses so strongly the importance
of institutions: He emphasizes only one, the money economy, but
that, of course, is an aspect of economic life which has existed
almost immemorially and in the face of the most disparate insti-
tutional situations.
If one may cavil at the indistinctness of the institutional picture,
it must be admitted, on the other hand, that the conducting of the
investigation in the light of a given institutional situation gave to
Business Cycles its great theoretical importance. The principal
argument of orthodox economists against Veblen's evolutionary
approach has been that, while it might throw light upon the devel-
opment of economic institutions, it could add nothing to our
knowledge of the process of the economic system as at present con-
stituted. They have, in the more self-conscious atmosphere of the
century, regarded their analysis as concerned with a
cross section of time, and have elaborated their systems of normal-
ity. with the qualification that the principles which they expound
are applicable only to the present situation—whatever may have
been the economic organization of times past.
By confining himself to the present and immediate past,
Mitchell undercut this defense of the orthodox discipline. The
whole bearing of his study, in fact, tended to discredit the notions1.74 PAUL T. HOMAN
of normality and of an equilibrium of forces. He writes that, "One
who turns from reading economic theory to reading business his-
tory is forcibly, impressed by the artificiality of all assumptions of
a 'static' or even a 'normal' condition in economic affairs. For,
despite all efforts to give technical meanings to these ambiguous
terms, they suggest the idea of, an unchanging order, or of an order
which ecOnomic principles are always tending to re-establish after
every aberration. But a review of business annals never discloses
a 'st4tic' or a 'normal' state in either of these senses. On the
contrary, in the real world of business, affairs are always under-'
going a cumulative change, always passing through some phase of
a business cycle into some other phase... .Infact, if not in theory,
a state of change in business conditions is the only 'normal'
state."7
This disbelief in normality was doubtless held by Mitchell pre-
viously to the initiation of the study. But the result of the investiga-
tion was to confirm the For nowhere could there be disk
cerned any line of normality from which prices diverged or to
which they were drawn back. On the.contrary, there seemed to
be an inevitable cumulation of events which carried business ac-
tivity through successive phases, to the constant and never-ending
disturbance of the material welfare of various classes of people. In
the end, therefore, Mitchell was confirmed in the conviction that
the only way in which to formulate 'a realistic statement of eco-
nomic activity was in terms of a process, of a cumulative sequence
of events. In those terms nothing is "normal" and nothing "ab-.
normal." All events and eventualities are equally a part of the
process. The economist is obligated, so far as may be, to throw
light upon the process, and the only way in which to do this is by
way of careful examination of all the objective facts bearing upon
whatever problem he may have in, hand.
Veblen had, of course, propounded the theory of process as the
fundamental notion, of economic speculation. Working in those
Mitchell succeeded in making the greatest single contribu-
tion to knowledge concerning one of the most mysterious phases
of current economic life. It may not be too much to say that he
only succeeded in doing so by reason of the freedom of his mind
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from the constricting hold of any formal system of theory. Yet
one cannot say that his work demonstrated the uselessness of the
more speculative attacks upon this problem. For most of the clues
which he followed were furnished by men whose speculations were
formally tied to sOme system as he himself pointed out. And his
results demonstrated less any lack of perspicacity on their part than
the incompleteness of their theories. They were for the most part
not wrong; they merely attributed causation to factors which, on'
more intimate view, appeared only as a few among many factors
in the cumulationcauses. Mitchell would perhaps say that
speculative thinkers are useful people to supply leads to stimulate
the thinking of scientific investigators. But he would hold that
cogitation is no substitute for laborious investigation if we are to
arrive at any adequate comprehension of the complicated processes
through which the economic system functions.
That, of course, was an idea which had been suggested by such
theorists as Clark when he marked out "economic dynamics" as
the fertile field for future economic investigation, and Marshall,
when he suggested that quantitative analysis must be the field of
future importance. Mitchell. is decidedly the apostle of quantita-
tive analysis. But he would say that such analysis could only be
handicapped by working in subservience to a preconceived system
like Clark's, and that the problems encountered would not fall
into the categories of Marshall's qualitative analysis. The only
scientific generalizations are those which arise out of the data avail-
able. Speculative generalizations are only a second-best in the
absence of other knowledge, and logical systems deduced from
simplified postulates cannot by any stretch of the imagination, be
• held to give an adequate or accurate account of the operation of
the economic system. , .
•Enough has perhaps been said to permit the relation •of
Mitchell's findings to orthodox economic theory to be crystallized
into a single point. Veblen's method of demolishing systematic
theory is to cast doubt upon its postulates. Mitchell appeals to his
mass. of facts and distills them into a convincing picture of eco-
nomic processes which lends no support to the conclusions of sys-
tematic theàry. He thus appears, not as a parrot of Veblen, but
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with a wholly different technique, to complete the discrediting of
the scheme of thought in which economic have framed
their systems.
Quantitative analysis, in the hands of its very competent user
in the field of economics, has thus come to take the form, not of
verifying or modifying the conclusions which have been arrived
at by qualitative analysis, but of marshaling facts without refer-
ence to "principles" and drawing such conclusions or generaliza-
tions as the facts themselves afford. It is possible to see, then, why
Business Cycles, which was not primarily a project in economic
theory, has achieved a position of such outstanding importance in
the field of theory. The gradual dissemination of the point of view
and the conclusions contained in it has not only had the effect of
weakening the hold of orthodox economic views upon the younger
generation of economists, but has at the same time introduced
them to a type of analysis which contains the promise of fruitful
results. One may perhaps say that Mitchell's outstanding contribu-
tion to the economic thought of his time has consisted in promoting
the metamorphosis from the attempt to normalize economic life
to the attempt to comprehend the complicated processes of eco-
nomic life a realistic quantitative investigation of the
facts.
We have perhaps given sufficient consideration to the aspects
of Mitchell's theoretical position illustrated by his study of busi-
ness cycles. It is curious to recall how little attention the theoretical
implications of the book elicited upon its appearance. Widely
praised, by economists as a factual study of cycles, it received only
belated and partial consideration as a treatise on economic theory.
Its formidable size did not invite full and careful reading, and one
must suppose that economic theorists did not generally, read, nor
fully comprehend, the significance of the second chapter and the
other brief scattered passages within which the theoretical frame-
work'is stated.18
Professor Pigou, for example, in a commendatoryreview in The Economic.
Journat, March 1914, states that this "massive work—by far the most elaborate
treatise on the subject that has yet appeared in the English language—must
command the attention of all students of industrial fluctuations." He makes no
mention of its relation to general economic theory and, though quoting at
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There has been no intention of intimating that his work on the
subject was authoritative or final. He himself concluded his study
with a modest disclaimer of finality, and with suggestions for
future investigation. It is strictly consonant with his view of the
economist's task to admit that finality is an unattainable ideal. Im-
pressed with the enormous complexity of the arrange-
ments under which we live, he thinks it the task of many men
anaccurate understanding of
them. His own work thus ranks as but one item in a vast co-opera-
tive scientific effort to trace economic processes into their endless
-ramifications.
Moreover, the ceaseless changes which develop tend to doom
any study of current facts to early obsolescence, and to involve
investigators in the eternal process of keeping pace with the faéts.
For, in Mitchell's view, which is a moral view, the facts most
worth investigating are those most immediately bearing upon the
well-being of the social body. Such facts are, of course, present
facts. The search for them is dictated by problems of social mal-
adjustment, and the end in view is social amelioration.
His study of business cycles established Mitchell as the fore-
most student of that problem, but it was perhaps the fortuitous
circumstance of the disconcerting behavior of prices during the
war and after that swept him into wider prominence. Under the
saddening impact of recent experience, the problem in which he
pioneered has come for the time being to be ranked as perhaps the
most important and fundamental of our economic problems, with
the consequence that Mitchell has come to be regarded as one of the.
foremost American economists. The fortuitous character of his rise
is not, however, likely to detract from the influence of his example,
because, for one thing, the problem with which he has been pri-
marily concerned has been recognized as intimately related to
almost every other economic problem, and, for another, the objec-
tive investigation of economic problems has pushed perhaps per-
manently into the foreground of the attention of economists. At
a scheme of thought quite antipathetic to his own doctrinal system. Merely to
call it a study of. "industrial fluctuations" is, of misconceive its nature
and to the significance of the title, in which the word "business" is
used in a technical sense as contrasted to "industrial," with malice aforethought.
/
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the same time, a growing recognition on the part of the responsible
leaders of politicaland economic groups of the complexity of our
economic arrangements has led them to expect economists to play
the part of experts.
There is.thus transpiring a removal of the circumstances which
earlier inhibited American economists from any appreciable influ-
ence upon the course of events, and turned their attention largely
into speculative channels. Mitchell was, in a sense, the forerunner
of this current phase, and is the recognized leader of the group of
economists whose interest lies in a realistic approach to economic
problems. Of course, other economists before Mitchell. had made
excellent monographic studies, particularly in the fields of cur-
rency, transportation, monopoly, and taxation. Perhaps the dif-
ference which marked most of them off from Mitchell and others
who work inspirit was that their investigations started from
the preconceptions of a definite system of logical theory. Mitchell's
primary preconception, on the other hand, is that the economic
process cannot be constrained within the bounds of a' system of
logic. His goal is objective reality, not logical consistency.
III
If.Veblenis the Messiah, Mitchell is at least the high priest of
what has come to be called in the United States "institutional eco-
nomics," the devotees of which are coming to' include aconsider-
able proportion of the more capable younger economists. It cannot
be said that there is any particular unanimity among them as to
the proper scope and method of this new and well-advertised'
brand of economics. They hold in, common a highly skeptical atti-
tude toward the "principles" of all variants of classical economic
theory. Their common aim is to throw light upon the institutional
arrangements through which the economic process functions.
They entertain a somewhat attenuated hope that out of their
labors may ultimately arise some, sort of synthesis that will consti-
tute a generally acceptable body of economic theory. Loosely
bound together, they recognize one 'another by these signs.
They are in the meantime delving each in his own corner of the
economic system under the impulse of various motives; Their workPLACE IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 179
at present consists for the most part of monographic studies. They
maintain a high ideal of scientific objectivity, but are in general
guided in their choice.of subjects for investigation by the desire to
be of assistance in an intelligent scheme of social reform. Wherever
theperation of our economic institutions appears to raise some
human problem they will be found, whether in questions of inter-
national finance, railroad administration, business combination,
labor relations, legal institutions in their economic bearing, the
distribution of income, corporation finance, or what not. Their
scent for problems is like that of bears for honey.
For such a group there can obviously be no official spokesman.
As the most eminent of their number, Mitchell speaks with some-
what more authority than others. He has, too, given more thought
to the general theoretical problems of this type of economics than
any of his fellows, and in a disconnected series of papers and
articles during the last fifteen years has given expression to ideas
which may be pieced together into a sort of philosophy of the
tutional approach to economics. We shall briefly examine these
ideas in so far as they run in other terms than those imbedded in
the framework of Business Cycles. It must not be supposed that
they represent any consensus on the. part of institutional econo-
mists. But it must at the same time be understood that they roughly
reflect the intellectual .backgroundto the work of a great many
economists. .
Ithas already been pointed out that Mitchell accepted Veblen's
view that economic studies must be congruent with the evolution-
ary viewpoint. This is the basis for fitting facts into a conception
of "process" instead of "equilibrium," and for eschewing the con-
cept of "normality" in economic life. It has further been noted
that, while Veblen utilizes his idea of the genetic approach by
interpreting history in the large in its economic bearing, as the
introduction to rather sweeping generalizations on contemporary
economic organization, Mitchell gives the idea content by a
minute analysis and interpretation of facts and figures bearing
upon a particular limited problem. The genetic approach is obvi-
ously one that lends itself to a great variety of method. Taken as
a somewhat vague orientation of ideas, it may be said to rank as
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as an essential part of Mitchell's armory of general ideas. It serves
both as the basis of his dissent from older types of theory and as
the foundation for the framework of his constructive work.
No problem of economic theory seems more significant to
Mitchell than the economist's view of human nature. It is one of
the fundamental items of his viewpoint that no theory can be con-
sidered scientifically tenable which rests upon a view of human
nature at odds with the best authenticated views of psychologists
upon the subject. Since modern psychology gives no support to the
hedonistic view of human nature, with its upon action as
the result of rational choice between the alternatives, of pleasure
and pain, all systems of theory that explicitly or implicitly rely
upon such a view become in his mind at once untenable. His inter-
est in this aspect of economic theory has led him to follow at least
as closely as any other economist the recent literature of psycho-
logical investigation, and to take his bearings anew from time to
time with the advances in psychological knowledge. To most econ-
omists with an interest in psychology the rapidly changing views
and diversity of opinion in that field have been frequently discoñ-
certing, not to say irritating. For, attempting to build upon a sound
psychological foundation, they find that they have built upon shift-
ing sands. The reaction, among those who demand a feeling of
certainty in their economic principles, has been in the direction of
a relative or even absolute denial of the dependence, of economic
theory upon psychology.
Mitchell, however, is plagued by no such impatience. For he
thinks that no fields of knowledge dealing with human behavior,
as economics does, can attain to thoroughly scientific generaliza-
tions until we know "why we act like human beings." He has a
sufficiently modest apprehension of. the achievements of modern
science to admit that there is very much .that we do not know. And
he is willing to reserve judgment upon doubtful points in the ab-
sence of authentic knowledge. He is the better able to do this, in'
that he is not wedded to any scheme of logical theory which de-
mands at least an implicit set of psychological assumptions.
Like most students of the social sciences who took the trouble to
examine it, he was much impressed by William McDougall's
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functioning, rather than the structure, of the mind, it appeared to
bear directly upon the problems of human behavior, with which
the social sciences are concerned. This approach to psychology
strengthened his disbelief in the psychological postulates of cur-
rent types of systematic economic theory.1° And he has, for
purposes of his own thinking, for the most part accepted Mc-
Dougall's central thesis that the instincts are the prime movers
in human activity. In this view, the ends of life are instinctive,
and the instincts which dictate them are stable and enduring.
The factor of intelligence, or rationality, enters into the case as
an instrumental means by which men, seek to realize the instinc-
tively appointeçl ends. For the most part the 'means employed
represent merely types of action which have become habitual.
They operate through the agency of established institutions which
are themselves no more, than crystallized habits of thought and
action.
Where, as in business enterprise, the element of rational cal-
culation is obviously an important factor in economic activity,
rationality is not related to the underlying ends of life. No more
is apparent than that certain types of action are rational in rela-
tion to the institutions through which they function. Business en-
terprise functions through the "money economy" and can be ra-
tionally practiced on the basis of a system of accounting. But this
means only that men exercise intelligence in the pursuit of a money
income and tells us nothing about the relationship between money
incomes and the "psychic incomes" or satisfactions which are de-
rived from spending the money incomes. The arts of consumption
are, indeed, so almost completely customary in character that they
are not at present reducible to analysis in terms of rationality. The'
point of the argument is plain—that economic rationality is itself
a social phenomenon calling for explanation; that it can be ex-
plained only by resort to a scientific explanation of human nature;
that it grows out of a certain type of institutions, or means to ends;
'°See,e.g., the discussion of Pantaleoni, Fisher, Clark, and Marshall in an
article, "The Rationality of Economic Activity," in the Journal of Political
Economy, February and March 1910. "A man who reads books like McDoug-
all's and accepts their conclusions may well become skeptical of the value of
economic theory like that provided by Jevons, Fisher and Clark."o 182 PAUL T. ROMAN
and that rational action comprises only a limited part of economic
activity.
One approaches thus the reason for the peculiar tenderness of
economists of Mitchell's type for modem psychology. It forms an
inseparable link in the argument for the genetic approach. When
it has appeared that the more fundamental, if obscure, ends of
action are imbedded in stable instincts, it follows that the great
majority of human actions are but the habitual means through
which these obscure ends are sought. Habitual action is the crea-
ture of time and place, endlessly' changing. An adequate under-
standing of most of our behavior is thus to be sought by tracing the
mutations of the institutions which have led up to the presen± situa-
tion. Some notion of the future may be derived from 'a thoroughly
realistic understanding of the present. Mitchell's position here is
not far removed from that of Veblen. It crystallizes about the
conviction that the important fieldeconomic investigation is
the institutional structure of society. Original human nature is, in
a sense, removed from the economist's problem. Interest comes to
• center on that part .of behavior which cumulatively changes under
the moulding influence of institutions.20
Mitchell is particularly receptive to the opinion of Professor
Thorndike that human nature is highly plastic, in the sense that
action is the result of a highly complex interaction of instinctive
propensities, and that what passes for human nature is largely types
of action called forth by a given institutional situation. He ap-
plauds the substantially similar view of Graham Wallas that the
"human nature" of one generation is determined chiefly by. its nur-
ture at the hands of the preceding generation.2' The corollary of
these views is, of course, that under different institutions men
"Ifour present beliefs are confirmed, that the human nature which men
inherit remains substantially the same over millenniums, and that the changes
in human life are due mainly to the evolution of culture, economists will con-
centrate their studies to an increasing degree upon economic institutions{,]
the factor which certainly admits of change and perhaps admits of control."
From the presidential address, "Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory,"
delivered before the American Economic Association, December 1924. Pub-
lished in the American Economic Review, March 1925.
See an article, "Human Behavior and Economics," in the Quarterly Journal
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might behave quite differently without in any sense violating the
dictates of original human nature.
The peculiar appeal of such views to Mitchell is that they form
the basis of optimism concerning the possibilities of social reform.
They catch him on his moral side, which is strongly developed.
They wipe out the conservative defense that this or that reform is
"against human nature." They ally themselves naturally to the
psychologists' view that intelligence, or thinking, is an instrument
reserved for use on special occasions when men are faced by prob-
lems not amenable to an habitual solution. It thus appears that,
as society is faced with major problems, it may effect an effusion of
intelligence which will .guide its course toward ends which it has
set for itself. The prerequisite for intelligent guidance to socially
determined ends is an adequate understanding of our present insti-
tutional structure. Thus the social scientists who are engaged in
supplying this knowledge are playing an essential part in the pro-
gressive solution of social problems.
It follows from Mitchell's attitude toward psychology that the•
relation of economics to that science is something more than a
mere debt. Not only does psychology give economists a framework
of ideas within which to conduct their investigations. Conversely,
economists. are uncovering a mass of facts concerning how men
behave and to that extent are making a contribution to social psy-
chology. "It was because hedonism offered a theory of how men
act that it exercised so potent an influence upon economics. It is
because they (the social psychologists) are developing a sounder
type of functional psychology that we may hope both to profit by
and to share in the work of contemporary psychologists. But in
embracing this opportunity economics will assume anew charac-
ter. It will cease to be a system of pecuniary logic, a mechanical
study of static equilibria under nonexistent conditions, and become
a science of human behavior."22
The logic of this viewpoint has led Mitchell, in recent years, to
incline toward the "behaviorist school" of psychologists. From the
standpoint of that school, knowledge of human nature is confined
to the observation of its objective manjfestations. In the light of
that preconception economics becomes less a debtor than a con-
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tributor to psychology. It supplies the necessary data
onetype of behavior. To what extent Mitchell accepts this view he
has never taken occasion to say publicly. In any case it would little
affect his general viewpoint, and it is safer doubtless to interpret
him in the light of his published declarations.
Mitchell's viewpoint has by this time been sufficiently examined
from various angles to demonstrate the convergence of all his argu-
ments upon his central conviction—that the economist's appointed
task is to examine the nature and functioning of social institutions.
That conviction is the logical outcome of the genetic approach, or
one may say preconception, by which one thinks of a given cultural
situation, not as final, but as a passing phase of proc-
ess. It is supported by the views of many psychologists. And in
Mitchell's case it is supported by a strong predilection to assist in
the rational guidance of a great and complicated and in some de-
gree mysterious society which, under the bondage of custom, has
stumbled somewhat blindly into a forest of human problems.
It is the problems that fascinate him, challenging his intellect
and his sympathies, making his scientific work both mentally excit-
ing and morally satisfying. "Whether economics is to us a subject
of thrilling interests or a dismal pseudo-science depends upon our-
selves. If we come to it with literal minds, seeing only what has
been definitely accomplished, we find the diséussions dull and the
conclusions dubious. But if we come thinking of man's long strug-
gle to master his own fate, then the effort to solve economic prob-
lems seems a vital episode in human history, a hopef ul portent for.
the future. Seen in this perspective, economic speculation repre-
sents a stage in the growth of mind at which man's effort to under-
stand and control nature becomes an effort to understand and
control himself and his society. ...Thefuture of economics, the
question whether men will ever succeed in establishing a service-
able science of human behavior, becomes one of the crucial issues
on which hangs the doubtful fate of humankind."23
Mitchell's loose formula for economics, that it is a science of
human behavior engaged in examining the structure and function-
ing of the institutions through which economic activity takes place,
From an article, "The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend of Economics
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is plainly comprehensive enough to include studies of widely dif-
feting range and character. It includes orthodox economists in so
far as they realistically portray the processes of current life; it has
a particular niche of honor for Sombart, Sidney and Beatrice
Webb, and Veblen, who learned from Marx "the scientific possi-
bilities in his way of working," and are "studying the evolution of
economic institutions in a scientific,.as opposed to an historical or
a propagandist, spirit."24 There is a place for the monographic
study of the problems of transportation, labor, banking, trusts, and
so on. The realization that theoretical economic inquiries cluster
about the working of institutions "establishes upon a common plane
the work of those who seek to know how economic organization
has developed in the past, of those who seek to know how it func-
tions in the present, and of those who seek to know what changes it
promises to undergo in the future."25 "When, however, economic
theory is made an account of the cumulative change of economic
behavior, then all studies of special institutions become organic
parts of a single whole. ...Economictheory will cease to be a thing
apart from applied economics, because economic theory itself will
deal with genuine issues."26
The reason for undertaking these various sorts of investigation is
very plain to Mitchell's mind. It is no detached "idle curiosity,"
nor any coldly objective desire to know. "In economics as in other
sciences we desire knowledge mainly as an instrument of control.
Control means the alluring possibility of shaping, the evolution of
economic life to fit the developing purposes of our race."27 With-
out dropping his insistence upon the scientific method of accurate
observation, he allies himself to Dewey's conception that human
thought and action are inevitably intermixed, to the end of achiev-
ing the goals which are more or less clearly set up. In Mitchell's
thought these goals seem something more than the immediate goals
of individuals or groups. He tacitly personalizes society; and ap-
pears to assume that society as such has a will of its own and goals
of its own. Social evolution takes on a somewhat dramatic form,
Ibid.,pp. 18-19.
From an article, "The Role of Money in Economic Theory," in the American
Economic Review, Supplement, March 1916,p. 160.
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as a sortofcosmic struggle, in. which the social will is striving, in
the midst of the discordant purposes of its members, to achieve its•
ends, by and with the advice of its more intelligent counselors, the
social scientists. It is not to be supposed that Mitchell ever permits
himself to be drawn so far as this into the imponderable marshes of
social philosophy. We wish merely to indicate that, were he more
a philosopher and less a statistician, this is where his footsteps
would seem to lead.
Enough has been said to indicate the broader outlines of
Mitchell's conception of economic theory. It leads him to the very
borderland of philosophical speculation. But across that boundary
he never steps. For, though Mitchell is somewhat philosophically
minded, one is aware always of the restraining influence of a life-
time's work of realistic investigation, of marshaling statistics and
interpreting their meaning. He does not have what one would
call an original mind, but rather a workmanlike mind. His dis-.
sent from orthodox economics is not original. It is taken from Veb-
len. His subordination of economic investigation to ends of social
welfare runs in terms that may be traced to Dewey and Hobson
and others within whom the moral urge is dominant. For the gen-
eral terms in which his thinking runs he is in the position of a
to a considerable range of thinkers. The cathartic effect of
Veblen's early influence cleared his system of tradition, and left
him with a hearty appetite and sound powers of absorption for
innovating and progressive thinking in the social sciences. Omni-
vorous in his reading, catholic in his sympathies, and eclectic in
his thinking, he has done much to popularize new approaches to
social problems and to make them intellectually acceptable and
professionally respectable.
But it is not as a loud-speaker for any set of secondhand ideas
that he has achieved his significance in the field of economics. It is
in the alliance between his intellectual approach to economic prob-
lems and his technical handling of them that he is and
His method is that of a quantItative analysis. He is the
prophet of facts and figures. He believes that in dealing with the
mass of phenomena of social organization our one authoritative and
impartial source of information is statistics. Much of his energy
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tion available to economists. The rest of it has been largely devoted
to collecting such information, interpreting the economic signifi-
cance of the data which he handles, indicating the relation of the
facts disclosed to the common welfare, and devising methods for
the social control of the aspects of economic organization where
his investigations have indicated that it is possible and desirable.
His enthusiasm for quantitative information is so great that on
one or two occasions he has almost permitted himself to say that
intelligent social reform is only a matter of possessing the necessary
factual data on which to build.28 Never committing himself quite
that far, he nevertheless insists that statistical investigation is the
most scientific instrument of economic analysis, and that it consti-
tutes an essential, if not the most important, tool of rational social
development. As might be expected of so ardent a champion of
facts, he is not a little .impatient of mere agitation and propaganda
as instruments of reform. They appear to him unintelligent.
This conviction that knowledge of facts, particularly statistical
facts, is essential to the proper co-ordination of our complicated
economic organization has been pretty thqroughly disseminated
and acèepted, not only among economists, but among business-
men, officials, reformers, trade-union leaders, one might say among
responsible or intelligent people in general. The manifold prob-
lems of social adjustment—wage disputes, minimum-wage iws,
railway rates, marketing arrangements, business fluctuations, un-
employment, allocation of taxes, and what not—all occasion resort
to the tangible evidence of quantitative data. It is not Mitchell, of
course, who has done this. The phenomenon grew out of a compli-
cated social situation. But, so far as one man can be singled out
for credit, he has played a pre-eminent part.; He has pioneered in
the application of statistical method to economic problems and in
all seasons urged the importance of this instrument. He has dem-
onstrated the advantages and uses of statistical analysis, and has
been its spokesman and its philosopher.
When so much has been said, one may perhaps wonder whether
the nature of Mitchell's work has not decidedly colored his con-
clüsions. For a quarter of a century and more his work has been
See, e.g., an article, "Statistics and Government," in the Quarterly Publica-
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mainly concerned with price studies, a field within which statisti-
cal technique is the primary instrument. His studies have centered
around the pursuit of profits, wherein he finds the key to business
fluctuations. It is at least an open question whether his own suc-
cessful use of statistics has not been generalized into an exaggerated
statement of their place in the scheme of things.
Moreover, his concern with distinctly "business" processes and
"business" habits of thought may explainthe primary causal influ-
ence which he attributes to the "money economy" as the rational-
izing influence in economic activity. One might understand the
following passage as a criticism of orthodox economic theory, but
it appears as a strangely narrow view for one who assumes the
province of economic theory to be the descriptive analysis of eco-
nomic institutions: "Because it thus rationalizes economic life
itself, the use of money lays the foundation .for a rational theory
of that life. Money may not be the root of all evil, but it is the root
of economic science."29 Such bias as Mitchell displays in an exag-
gerated view of the place of quantitative analysis in economic in-
vestigation and of the institutional importance of the money econ-
omy in shaping economic activity may reasonably be explained in
terms of a lifetime's preoccupations.
It would not, as we have indicated, be true to say that Mitchell
sees quantitative analysis as the sole method for advancing eco-
nomic studies. He merely considers it the most scientific, and
stresses the instrument with whose use he is most familiar. He rec-
ognizes the existence of important facts that do not lend themselves
to quantitative treatment and admits the essential service of quali-
tative analysis in institutional economics. He says, for example,
"Quantitative work cannot dispense with distinctions of quality.
In the thinking of competent workers, the two types of analysis
will co-operate with and complement each other as peacefully in
economics as they do in chemistry?'3° Such passages are, however,
of a parenthetical sort, and represent a field of thought upon which
he has not been moved to bestow much consideration.
The sort of union between qualitative and quantitative analysis
6'The Role of Money in Economic Theory," op. cit., p. 157.
"Quantitative Analysis in Economic Theory," American Economic Review,
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which Mitchell foresees is not of the sort that was in Alfred
Marshall's mind. Marshall thought that the kind of forces that
operate in the market place had .been pretty well canvassed. Lim-
iting the scope of economic science primarily to the problem of
value, he limited the qualitative analysis, which he thought so
nearly complete, to the aspects of economic activity bearing upon
that problem. He recognized, however, the broad implications of
value theory and permitted his analysis to roam widely over the
surface of human affairs and to penetrate into their hidden depths.
His view was that statistical analysis would give objective evidence
of the relative intensity or importance of the play of forces com-
prised within his general scheme of thought. Concerning the gen-
eral outlines of value theory, his yiew displays something of the
naive self-esteem exhibited in Mill's famous dictum a generation
before.
Mitchell thinks quite otherwise. He considers Marshall's view of
economic behavior, as controlled by two opposing sets of motives,
anobsolete conception. He does not, therefore, look for any statis-
tical measurement of the force of motives, nor think it desirable
that quantitative analysis should be subordinated to any precon-
ceived analysis of the forces at work. He wishes quantitative anal-
ysis to address itself strictly to the objective phenomena at hand,
supported by whatever analysis of unmeasurable forces is relevant
to the particular problem.
Qualitative analysis, relieved from supporting any particular sys-
tem of theory, takes on a double nature. It is, in the first place, a
subsidiary instrument for handling the incommensurable factors
which arise in any particular quantitative investigation. Its second
and more important use lies in setting the ends of human endeavor.
Holding that economic science is the handmaiden of the race in
attempting to increase its economic welfare, Mitchell is compelled
to recognize that welfare is not a concept that lends itself to meas-
urement. At bottom, concepts of welfare are based upon our sym-
pathies, prejudices, interests, or preconceptions. Mitchell, for ex-
ample, could doubtless trace the genealogy of the humanitarian-
ism of which he is so warm a partisan. These simple truths he
recognizes only to neglect them. One feels it not a little paradoxi-
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to achieve its dimly perceived and changing purposes should glorify
the statistical instrument almost to the point of discounting the
ends to which it is a tool, and certainly to the point of neglecting
the manifold if intangible forces which enter into the institutional
situation.
Mitchell is not a little critical of ecOnomic theorists like Jevons,
Clark, and Fisher, whose love of logical precision eventuates in
the mere "mechanics of utility." It would appear thathis own love
for facts and figures opens him to a somewhat similar criticism,
that his economics inclines to be the "apotheosis of statistics."
Statistics, no matter how complete, will not explain the social
philosophy underlying a demand for minimum-wage legislation,
or trust regulation, or lower railway rates for farm products, or
government operation of the coal industry: All this Mitchell would
doubtless admit. He might well say that under the necessities of a
division of intellectual labor he was willing to let others speculate
upon the immediate and remote ends of social policy while he
busied himself with collecting the data with which responsible
men might assess the ends or upon which they might build a
better order.
Such strictures as one may bring against Mitchell, in terms of
his own scheme of thought, are principally matters of emphasis.
Being so much the spokesman of his own craft, he appears at times
to be something less than an adequate spokesman for the institu-
tional approach to economics. He shrinks from the philosophical,
the intangible, the incommensurable. And if such reticence is
pardonable in the economist whose gaze is centered upon• the
marts of trade, it ill becomes one who thinks of economics as the
study of human behavior and human institutions, in which those
elusive characteristics are so pronounced.
Enough has perhaps been said of Mitchell's work, and of his
views concerning the scope and method of economics. To inquire
whether those views constitute a body of "economic theory" would
carry us into a controversy too warm to be comfortable, and not
relevant to our purpose. Certainly he has no "system" of economic
theory in the sense that Marshall or Clark or Fetter has a system,
logically tied together. He has, on the other hand, a foundation of
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biological theory of evolution; the sociological theory of a devel-
oping organic society; ..an.epistemological theory of a
sort; a psychological theory embodying stability of instincts and
the subsidiary nature of intelligence; and a theory of the institu-
tional origin of most overt human behavior. He would say that
these theories are based upon modem scientific research, and
furnish as sound an ideological basis as is obtainable for scientific
research into the processes of human society.
He might further contend that systematic economic theory,
when run to its source, has a way of merging into psychology,
epistemology, metaphysics, and analogy to the physical sciences,
wherein its footing is less stable than that of his own scheme of
thought. From this he might argue that his view that the central
task of economics is an objective study of institutions—their his-
tory, processes, direction, and effects upon human welfare—may
be validly called a form of economic theory. He might further
add that within the confines of a given investigation 'there would
often be need for the use of highly theoretical work Of the logical
sort by way of filling in the interstices where factual data were
not available. He could even admit the uses of systematic theory
within the bounds of his approval, as an enlightening display of
the logic of certain forces.
Of some such material is compounded Mitchell's claim that
he and other "institutionalists" are economic theorists. The claim
is perplexing and distressing to those who draw their scheme of
thought from orthodox sources. Obviously Mitchell's formula for
economic theory is highly eclectic, loose, and inclusive. It has a
resting-place for all and sundry, if only they are engaged. in eluci-
dating human behavior on its economic side. Hospitality, it is
true, proceeds on a plan of graded warmth, from a certain coolness
toward logical processes at one extreme, to an effusive cordiality
toward statistical analysis at the other. But all are welcome.
Over and around the whole position is wrapped the warm
mantle of a high moral purpose. That the function of economics,
in conjunction with the other social sciences, is to aid in
melioration is the enveloping preconception. That, of course, is
a matter quite apart from science. There is no scientific reason. to
suppose that the evolutionary process of cumulative causation is
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amenable to intelligent social control. It may be a matter of blind
force, of electrons or chemical processes. And then again it may
not be. There is no guide here but faith. And it is in this homely
human trait that Mitchell's approach tO economics ultimately
rests.
Meantime, the view of economics of which Mitchell is the OUt-
standing figure represents the most marked trend of the present
time in the United States. Economic theory with a longer classical
pedigree is still formally dominant in the schools. Objective eco-
nomic investigation is to a considerable degree tied to business
enterprise, with the immediate incentive of a favorable effect on
the credit balance in the profit-and-loss ledger. But an increasing
share of the sound scientific work is being devoted to, mono-
graphic studies of the economic system in detail, to the immediate
end of disclosing the manner of its working, to the ultimate end
of assisting in intelligent social guidance. Realism is Allah, and
Mitchell isprophet. Paradise may be around the corner.
It is not a little curious that the most eminent of our economic
workmen in the field of minute analysis of statistical data should
be so heavily indebted to an impressionistic cosmic philosopher
like Veblen, who heroically distorts facts and shows no evidence
of commerce with figures. Mitchell's work is of the sort that would
have pleased Marshall. One thinks of a certain resemblance be-
tween them in the union of moral and scientific interest in their
problems, and in the scientific precision of their methods.
But Mitchell's work proceeds within a general framework of
ideas not consonant with the general ideas of that excellent econo-
mist. It serves, therefore, to make more crucial the debated ques-
tion of what constitutes the essential theoretical' equipment of a
competent modern economist.